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I. INTRODUCTION
Most class action securities cases result in a settlement where the parties agree on a
defined amount of money to be placed in a fund for distribution to eligible beneficiaries.
Although the size of the fund and the losses suffered by eligible beneficiaries are defined,
the number of potential beneficiaries who decide not to participate in the settlement by
opting out and the number and value of losses eventually claimed by those eligible
beneficiaries are not known until long after the settlement amount has been established.
In any closed-end fund, like the securities class action settlements, there is the potential
for a ―Goldilocks‖ dilemma—the fund may be too large or too small for the claims being
made, not ―just right.‖ The ensuing tensions created by this mismatch between funds
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available and claims on those funds can be one of the most significant problems in any
settlement fund distribution. The ability of courts, special masters, and claims
administrators to cope with this mismatch is critical to the success of the distribution
process. Courts, lawyers, academics, and claims administrators have generally accepted
the traditional approaches normally taken in securities class action distribution processes
as appropriate under the circumstances. This Article presents several alternative
approaches for coping with the mismatch dilemma that are worthy of consideration for
incorporation in future distributions. The literature on distribution processes has given too
little attention to the successes and failures in cases that have utilized non-traditional
techniques, and it is likely that future distributions can benefit from these actual
experiences. The following case studies in both securities and non-securities contexts
illustrate the Goldilocks dilemmas that arise and discuss approaches that courts, lawyers,
and claims administrators might take to ameliorate them in situations where there are too
many opt-outs, too few claims, too many claims, too little money, or too much money.
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
The traditional approaches for coping with the mismatch between available funds
and funding needs are to use pro-ration when there is a shortage and cy pres when there is
an excess.1 The general assumptions underlying these approaches are that the distribution
process is a sunk cost and any additional distribution costs would be inefficient,
counterproductive, or both. 2 At the same time, it is possible to use pro-ration and cy-pres
to reach an outcome that most viewers would consider satisfactory—the process of
satisficing. The argument here is that there are changes both in the pre- and postdistribution processes that can ameliorate the degree of mismatch and should be
considered in anticipation that a mismatch might occur. That is, the distribution process
itself should incorporate techniques for coping with the mismatch rather than waiting
until the precise mismatch is known. The distribution process should not assume that new
techniques are inappropriate, even if they have not been approved by an appellate court
and even if the claiming period has ended.

1. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Proposed Final Draft 2009),
available at http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=80;
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and
Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements,
58 STAN L. REV. 411 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip]; James D. Cox & Randall S.
Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class
Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money].
2. Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money, supra note 1, at 878, 879; Robert H. Klonoff, Mark Herrmann &
Bradley W. Harrison, Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV.
727, 730–33, 750 (2008).
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III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
A. Surveys
It is often possible to gain a greater appreciation of the nature of mismatch problems
by surveying a sample of the universe of participants who seem to be exacerbating the
problem. If, for example, claimants have misunderstood the claiming process, they may
be able to be recategorized into a more appropriate claiming status. Surveys can be
implemented quickly to identify reasons for higher or lower than expected response rates.
Survey results can then inform mid-course corrections in a distribution process. In one
case, for example, survey results showed that the main reason for failure to file a claim
was related to a misunderstanding of the potential compensation. 3 Using this information
the claims administrator could add the estimated losses to future outreach initiatives,
thereby increasing response rates.
B. Filters
It is normal for a settlement agreement to define certain criteria for determining
eligibility for compensation in a settlement; in other words, to identify true positives. In
implementing those criteria, there is often a great deal of flexibility in the distribution
process for establishing filters, other than straight pro-ration, to deal with any anticipated
shortfall in distribution funds. By looking at the rationale for the settlement, or the nature
of the alleged wrongdoing, it may be possible to establish filters that perform a more
equitable triage function. These filters may enable the shortage of money to be borne less
evenly but more equitably.
C. Claim Forms
Most class action securities cases are handled by claims administrators who develop
claim forms that vary from case to case and from claims administrator to claims
administrator, resulting in a lack of standardization.4 At the same time, these forms often
tend to be focused on legal and administrative needs rather than on the needs of the
claimant.5 It is now possible to have multiple forms to meet all of those needs: electronic
forms, web forms, pre-populated forms, certification forms, option forms, and many
others to reduce the burden of filing and claim processing. By tailoring forms to certain
claimants and standardizing forms for others, it may be possible to increase response
rates significantly.

3. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/memorandum.pdf.
4. For an illustration of the variation among claim forms see the cases described on claims
administrators’ websites, for example, The Garden City Group, Inc., http://www.gardencitygroup.com (last
visited Oct. 27, 2009), and Gilardi & Co., LLC, http://www.gilardiandcompany.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2009);
Rust Consulting, http://www.rustconsulting.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
5. Federal Judicial Center, Section on Class Action Notices, Securities Class Action Certification and
Settlement:
Full
Notice,
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&
url_r=pages/376. In In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1409, M 21-95, 05 Civ.
7116 (WHP), 04 Civ. 5723 (WHP), slip op. at 12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2009), for example, the forms were
changed to focus on the needs of consumers by having a series of options.
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D. Outreach
In an effort to meet the legal requirements for notice and to conserve funds for
eventual distribution by minimizing transaction costs, there has been a standard outreach
process for class action securities distributions. 6 There are, however, many new—
generally electronic—methods for increasing outreach, and there are follow-up programs
that are not necessarily more expensive and that can be more efficient. For example, the
use of a central website that allows potential claimants to register and receive notice
online has shown much success.7 Automated follow-ups and deadline reminder messages
can also increase response rates.
E. Selective Pro-Ration
Rather than an across-the-board reduction in claim payments, there are a number of
more sophisticated methods for pro-rating claims that can be incorporated into a
distribution plan. Normally the distribution plans are written after the settlement
agreement has been reached. Anticipating a potential shortfall or excess of funds for
distribution can lead to provisions in the plan that would allow for a more fine-tuned
necessary reduction in payments on claims. If, for example, there is a disparity in the
types of claims—commercial/consumer, large/small, foreign/domestic, quantifiable/ nonquantifiable, and many others—it is possible to create different pro-ration rules for those
different categories rather than the one-size-fits-all approach. There may be an
independent yardstick that provides a more appropriate measure than linear mathematics;
there may be a progressive staging of pro-ration steps that are not uniform; there may be
statistical limits for categories of claims that can otherwise impact linear models.
IV. CASE STUDIES
A. In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation8
Forty-two pharmaceutical manufacturers were sued in 2001 for reporting false and
inflated average wholesale prices for certain types of drugs and for overpayments for the
affected drugs.9 In 2006, one defendant settled with the plaintiffs for $70 million.10 After
preliminary approval of the settlement, the claims administrator provided nationwide
notice by publication, website, and 2.5 million letters that included an explanation of the
settlement, a claim form, and an opt-out form.11
Within five months approximately 10,000 consumer claim forms were filed with a
preliminary estimated average value of about $230, and approximately 20,000 requests
6. Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 1, at 419; Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money, supra
note 1, at 867, 868.
7. See, e.g., Settlement Fund Clearinghouse, http://www.settlementfundclearinghouse.com (last visited
Oct. 23, 2009); Klonoff, Herrmann & Harrison, supra note 2, at 749, 750.
8. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 254 F.R.D. 35 (D.Mass. 2008) (MDL No. 1456),
as discussed in Francis E. McGovern, Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues in Managing
Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53, 58–63 (2008).
9. Id. at 58.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 59.
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for exclusion, or ―opt-outs,‖ were received.12 The large number of requests for exclusion,
relative to the number of claim forms, led to a survey of consumers who filed exclusion
forms.13 The purpose of the survey was to analyze the responses of claimants in order to
understand the disparity between claim forms and exclusions. Survey participants
answered a series of questions to determine (a) whether they were truly class
members, as opposed to, for example, persons who took an eligible drug but
had insurance that covered their co-payments, and (b) if they were part of the
class, why they chose to exclude themselves from the settlement.
....
A significant number of those surveyed did not remember taking any of the
covered drugs, many had insurance that covered their co-payment obligation,
and many had no recollection of a percentage co-payment or full payment for
the drug. Of those surveyed, 15.65% were estimated to be actual class members
based on recalling the covered drugs, being charged for the drugs, and either
having no insurance or having a percentage co-payment. During the course of
the phone survey, those determined to be actual class members were told that
they may be able to reconsider their decision to exclude themselves if they
wished to do so, and 18% indicated that they were interested in filing a claim.
This, added to the 16% who said they originally intended to file a claim when
they submitted the exclusion form, totals 34% of those determined to be class
members who said they were interested in filing a claim form. The estimates
derived from the survey were subject to unobserved sampling, response and
measurement error, but nonetheless provided important insights about the
eligibility and intention[s] of the opt-outs.14
Eventually, new claim forms were mailed to everyone who originally filed an
exclusion form and who indicated an interest in filing a claim form, along with a letter
saying that they could revoke their exclusion request and file a claim form by a new
deadline.15 The survey results suggested that 15.65% of 21,365 consumers who had filed
exclusion forms were, in fact, likely to be members of the class.16 This result extrapolates
to an estimate of 3344 actual class members who requested to opt out of the settlement.
In addition, the survey results suggested that some 16% of the actual class members who
sent in an exclusion form did so under the mistaken view that they were then filing a
claim; therefore, there would be 535 fewer opt-outs, or an amended total of 2809 actual
class members who intended to exclude themselves from the settlement. 17
Using the results of the survey, the universe of class members was redefined.
Ultimately, the number of opt-outs shrunk to a more acceptable number, which allowed
the administration of the distribution to proceed in accordance with the settlement
agreement.18
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
McGovern, supra note 8, at 59–60.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 61.
Id.
McGovern, supra note 8, at 62–63.
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B. In re Foreign Currency Exchange19
Plaintiff counsel filed an antitrust lawsuit against several credit card companies and
their related issuing banks, alleging that they had overcharged their customers from one
to three percent in foreign currency conversion fees in the use of their credit, charge,
debit, and ATM cards.20 Counsel settled the case with some of the defendants for $336
million.21 Counsel developed a claim form and a campaign to provide notice as part of
their settlement agreement.22 The claim form required that an eligible cardholder record
their annual expenditures in foreign transactions for each of their cards. 23 The credit card
companies enclosed the claims forms with one monthly account statement mailed to
cardholders.24 The claims administrator provided a website for downloading a claim
form and a toll free telephone number to answer questions from potential beneficiaries. 25
In the first six months, there were 90,000 claim forms filed—representing a response
rate of 0.45% in light of the 20.8 million notices mailed to card holders. 26 There were
also complaints filed with the court concerning the detailed reporting requirements in the
claiming process and inquiring why the expenditure information was not already
available to the claims administrator in a computerized format from the credit card
companies.27 The court halted the notice campaign and appointed a special master who
recommended a new notice and claim form to incorporate three options for
claimants to choose from depending on their estimated losses and ability to
thoroughly document their claim: (1) a flat payment of $25; (2) an estimate of
the number of days spent in foreign countries during the covered time period so
an algorithm of typical expenses would be applied to estimate a payment; and
(3) the original form of annual estimates of foreign expenditures by credit
card. . . . The flat payment option was designed to take advantage of claimants’
propensities to make claims only if the form is easy to understand and easy to
complete, in comparison to having to obtain 10 years of proof of foreign
spending. Based upon the forms filed prior to June 30, 2007, it was
recommended that an individual who spent no more than one week abroad or
had foreign currency expenditures not greater than $2500 would have been
eligible for a $25 payment that would be consistent with the limited foreign
conversion fees charged to most cardholders. At the same time, the level of
potential fraud was reduced from this option because only cardholders who had
foreign currency expenditures were included in the mailings.

19. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), as discussed in
McGovern, supra note 8, at 54–58.
20. Id. at 54.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. McGovern, supra note 8, at 54.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1409, M 21-95, 05 Civ. 7116 (WHP), 04
Civ. 5723 (WHP), slip op. at 10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2009).
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The second option was designed for customers who might feel that $25 was
inadequate but that compiling annual records was too onerous or not feasible.
Most foreign travelers can remember how many days they spend overseas
annually more easily than they can remember how much money they charged
on their credit cards. In an optimal world, the issuing banks would have had a
computerized listing of annual charges, but the databases for those charges
were not accessible for a variety of reasons, including changes in bank
ownership of cards, changes in card names, and incompatibility resulting from
changes in databases and their management software over time. By listing the
number of days spent overseas, however, a claimant would be more likely to
feel that the settlement payment would be based upon their actual
circumstances. The calculation of the algorithm could be accomplished from
publicly available data from the travel industry about foreign expenditures.
Although the public travel industry data was not a perfect fit, assumptions
could be made to approximate the annual currency conversion fees based upon
the number of days spent in a foreign country.
The third option was virtually identical to the one offered on the original
claim form. The resulting cover letter and claim form options were reviewed by
the lawyers and the claims administrator, and were further refined based on
testing and feedback obtained from focused interviews with potential
beneficiaries.28
The new claim form generated a remarkable 27% response rate, with 10,115,836
claims filed.29 7,200,413 claimants chose option one, 2,600,315 claimants chose option
two, and 315,108 claimants chose option three. In addition, approximately 22,000 late
claims and 2910 requests for exclusion were filed. 30
C. Personal Injury Cases
There are a number of lessons that can also be learned about settlement fund
distributions from experiences in connection with personal injury cases. These cases
often involve determinate amounts of funding and even more indeterminate demands on
that funding than securities cases. In the Dalkon Shield case there was excess money;31 in
the asbestos funds there is usually either too much or too little money;32 in the DDT
cases there were too many claimants;33 and in the Rhode Island Station Fire case34 there
was a potential conflict among different types of claimants. 35
28. McGovern, supra note 8, at 55–56.
29. Id. at 57.
30. Id.
31. In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988); Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, The Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust, and The Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 123
(1997).
32. Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution of Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust Distribution Plans, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 175 (2006).
33. Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1990, at 61, 63, 68.
34. Grey v. Derderian, Nos. CA 04-312L, CA 03-483L, 2009 WL 2997066 (D.R.I. Aug. 14, 2009).
35. Proposed Plan of Distribution, Grey v. Derderian, Nos. CA 04-312L, CA 03-483L (D.R.I. Mar. 5,
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A.H. Robins Co. filed for bankruptcy and established a qualified settlement fund for
persons who had filed claims for personal injuries suffered in connection with the use of
the Dalkon Shield.36 The fund contained $2.475 billion, the amount estimated during a
section 502(c) proceeding by the U.S. District Court overseeing the bankruptcy to be the
full value of the Dalkon Shield claims.37 Approximately five years later, after all the
claims had been processed and paid, there were significant monies remaining in the
fund.38 The U.S. District Court decided that the claims process should be supplemented
and ordered the distribution of the remaining money directly to claimants, regardless of
whether they were represented by counsel or pro se, so that they received an additional
85% of their original payment.39
In the asbestos bankruptcies there have been qualified settlement trusts with very
detailed trust distribution plans (TDP) designed to cope with the inevitable mismatch
between available and needed funding. 40 Some of the TDPs have a straight payment
percentage based upon a schedule of benefits negotiated by the claimants as part of the
TDP.41 Sometimes that percentage is less than 100%.42 In other instances, the schedule
of benefits is increased to reflect the available assets.43 In other TDPs, there is a collar or
payment ratio that limits the amount of the funds in a given year that can be paid to
certain categories of claims.44 In other instances, there are maximum available payments
or maximum annual payments that can roll over from year to year in the event that a
certain category of claims does not exhaust the funds available in a given year. 45
In the DDT cases in Triana, Alabama, over 13,000 claimants alleged that they had
been exposed to DDT from eating catfish.46 There was evidence that DDT had been
deposited in tributaries of the Tennessee River by a chemical plant, but that large a
number of persons whose background risk of DDT exceeded normal limits seemed
excessive. Counsel resolved the lawsuit by creating a single qualified settlement fund.47
The distribution plan, however, provided that claimants would need to be tested for DDE,
a metabolite of DDT, in their blood and have a DDE level above normal background
levels of DDE in order to be compensated.48 If the initial threshold of DDE was
exceeded, then the claimant could receive compensation. 49 Additional compensation was
made for claimants with multiples of DDE levels and for specific harms for claimants

2009) (No. 1964).
36. Vairo, supra note 31, at 123; see generally RICHARD B. SOBEL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF
THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991) (detailing the history and resolution of the Dalkon Shield litigation).
37. Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 659, 685 (1989).
38. Vairo, supra note 31, at 151.
39. Id.
40. McGovern, supra note 32, at 175.
41. Id. at 174–75.
42. Id. at 175 (explaining a fixed percentage payout when not all claims can be paid in full).
43. Id. at 174 (noting that the percentage may change over time).
44. Id.
45. McGovern, supra note 32, at 174.
46. McGovern, supra note 33, at 67.
47. Id. at 63–64.
48. Id. at 72–75 (discussing settlement plans and criteria).
49. Id. at 75 (listing testing for DDE and regulating levels above expected background as requirements for
payment).
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with excessive DDE in their blood.50 Needless to say, the number of eligible claimants
was substantially reduced.51
The Rhode Island Station Fire Settlement fund was based upon a ―point system‖
allocation formula.52 There was a negotiation among the lawyers representing the
claimants to establish a consensus on a yardstick that was commensurate with normal tort
system values.53 The point system used a base case with a predetermined number of
points for all personal injury and wrongful death cases. 54 The system then included
provisions allowing additional points for more substantial harm factors also derived from
tort system values.55 Once the point system was agreed to by the parties and approved by
the court, each claimant’s points were determined. 56 Then all the points were added
together and divided into the total amount of available settlement money to determine the
dollar value of each point.57 Once a claimant knew their individual total number of points
and the value of a point, their payment amount was calculated. 58 The potential for
conflicts among claimants over horizontal and vertical equity was avoided.59
D. The Global Research Analyst Settlement
The Global Research Analyst Settlement provides examples of new techniques in
claim forms, outreach, and triaging claim payments. 60 In that case, the SEC brought an
action against certain brokerage firms alleging wrongdoing by various research
analysts.61 The case settled for $432.75 million, which was placed in a qualified
settlement fund for the benefit of purchasers of certain stocks during certain time frames
from certain defendants, during which there had been alleged wrongdoing by various
research analysts.62 The court required the defendants to provide the names of all eligible
purchasers as well as qualifying sales of the applicable securities.63 As a result, it was
possible to send pre-populated certification forms that contained all the information
necessary to approve a claim; the claimant was required merely to verify and sign the
50. Id. at 73–74.
51. McGovern, supra note 33, at 68–72 (reporting the number of plaintiffs having elevated DDT levels to
be 33%, and the number that alleged specific harms to be even less).
52. Proposed Plan of Distribution, Grey v. Derderian, Nos. CA 04-312L, CA 03-483L (D.R.I. Mar. 5,
2009) (No. 1964).
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2–4.
56. Proposed Plan of Distribution, Grey, Nos. CA 04-312L, CA 03-483L (D.R.I. Mar. 5, 2009) (No.
1964).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Abby Goodnough, 5 Years After a Nightclub Fire, Survivors Struggle to Remake Their Lives, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at A18.
60. Letter from Francis E. McGovern, Professor of Law, Duke Univ., to the Honorable William H. Pauley
III, U.S. Dist. Court Judge, S. Dist. of N.Y. (June 5, 2006) at 2, 3, available at
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/letter.pdf (recommending approaches to disburse funds from
the Global Research Analyst Settlement) [hereinafter McGovern, Letter].
61. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/memorandum.pdf, at 2, 3.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. (describing requirement to provide transaction data).
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form.64 This preprinting process resulted in a claim filing rate that was three times greater
than the normal response rate for securities and other commercial class actions. 65
Notwithstanding the success of the claims process, there were still monies available
in some of the defendants’ funds, although others had been completely depleted. 66 The
court decided to proceed with a second distribution using state-of-the-art survey research
methodology in order to reach an unprecedented number of eligible claimants.67 The
additional techniques included pre-claim form letters to alert eligible purchasers that they
would be receiving a claim form, follow-up letters, and, in some instances, telephone
calls to encourage recipients to return their claim forms. Extensive outreach for claimants
who did not cash their checks was accomplished by mail and by telephone. Some letters
were sent in a special delivery format to enhance the chances that the recipient would
focus on them. All of these efforts resulted in increasing the response rate from 46% in
the first distribution to a total of 70% overall among potential claimants with estimated
losses, quite impressive given the fact that the second effort involved only those who had
not responded to the first distribution. 68
For those defendants whose funds were oversubscribed, the court approved a novel
triaging process that focused on the alleged harms caused by the stock analysts’
research—the proximity principle and the information principle:
If there is enough money available in a Distribution Fund to meet all claims
for losses from purchases through the relevant Settling Firm, investors will
receive 100 cents on the dollar. If, however, there is not enough money to meet
all claims, then a key goal is to distribute settlement funds to investors who are
more likely to have been affected by the events that are the subject of the
settlement. Although that goal may not be perfectly achievable, the plan uses
two principles to achieve a better approximation of that goal.
A. The Proximity Principle
The first principle is that purchases of equity securities that were made
shortly after the events that are the subject of the settlement are more likely to
have been affected by those events than purchases made more distant in time
from the events: the proximity principle. This principle is consistent with
provisions in the Final Judgments. If funds are not sufficient to compensate
investors in full for their eligible losses, the compensation formula will involve
a ―proximity adjustment.‖
Specifically, those investors who purchased the equity security closer to the
beginning of the ―relevant period of purchase‖ will receive a higher
compensation rate (that is, compensation as a share of eligible losses) than
those who purchased later. A maximum proximity adjustment rate of three
percent per trading day will help to ensure an equitable distribution of funds.
64. Id. at 9 (providing a description of Certification Form).
65. Analysis of historical case data compiled for presentation to the court in the Global Research Analyst
Settlement (on file with the author).
66. McGovern, Letter, supra note 60, at 1, 2.
67. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/memorandum.pdf, at 12.
68. Id. at 10, 12, 13.
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The proximity adjustment rate will be set at zero for the first eleven trading
days of the ―relevant period of purchase.‖
....
B. The Information Principle
The second principle focuses on the consumption of information prior to
making equity security purchases: the information principle. Purchasers who
make larger investments in equity securities are more likely to spend more on
obtaining information regarding those equity securities. Conversely, purchasers
of smaller amounts of equity securities are more likely to spend less on
information. This principle suggests, therefore, that the events that are the
subject of the settlement are more likely to have affected those investors
making smaller purchases than those investors making larger purchases. Like
the proximity principle, the information principle is consistent with provisions
in the Final Judgments.
Specifically, if an investor’s total purchases from a Settling Firm over the
relevant periods of purchase are larger than the median value for purchases of
the relevant equity securities from the Settling Firm, the adjustment will equal a
maximum of three percent for each multiple above the median. The information
adjustment will not apply to those investors with total purchases from a Settling
Firm over the relevant periods of purchase that are smaller than the median
value for purchases of the relevant equity securities from the Settling Firm.69
In addition, the court provided for pre- and post-judgment interest, rounding up to
a minimum $100 payment and payment of late filed claims for those defendants’ funds
that had not been fully depleted.70 Any remaining funds were to be remitted to the U.S.
Treasury.71
V. CONCLUSION
Closed end settlements in class action securities cases must invariably cope with a
mismatch between the dollar amount available for distribution and the dollar amount
actually claimed by eligible beneficiaries. This mismatch occurs because the settlement
amount becomes fixed before the distribution process begins and the claimed amount can
be determined. Traditional distribution methodology has primarily concentrated on
insuring that any shortfall is shared by the eligible beneficiaries evenly in a linear proration wherein all claims are reduced by the same proportionate amount. Any excess
monies remaining have been subject to cy pres distribution.
The suggestion here is that there are additional techniques beyond pro-ration that
should be considered in coping with the mismatch between distribution funds and

69. APPENDIX B: GLOBAL RESEARCH ANALYST SETTLEMENT DISTRIBUTION FUND PLAN, available at
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/fund.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
70. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Nos. 03 Civ. 2937-48, 04 Civ. 6909–10 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009) (order
directing disbursement of remaining funds), available at http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/
courtorder.pdf.
71. Id.
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claimed funds: surveys to identify excess or insufficient categories of claimants, filters to
concentrate on true positive claimants, more user friendly forms to reduce the burden of
participation, more selective proration techniques, secondary distributions, and better
outreach programs. By ensuring these and many other methods that are articulated in
social science and marketing research, it is possible to reduce the inevitable mismatch
and deliver settlement funds more efficiently and equitably with less residual monies
remaining.

